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Corruption in policing is a criminological phenomenon that is regularly misconstrued – 
whether as a case of independently-operating “rotten apples” or as a passive symptom of 
anomic organizational culture. This article seeks to reframe organized police corruption as an 
active process of seductive-recruitment, wherein corrupt officers utilized the same strategies as 
a conventional cult to both recruit and retain members. Using the example from Australia of 
the Queensland Police Force in the era before the Fitzgerald Inquiry as its primary case study, 
this article draws on a range of cult studies theories to develop an innovative framework for 
understanding the process by which an officer is lured into organized corruption. It discusses 
the intrinsic and extrinsic motivators for this in-group affiliation, with reference to matters of 
role and identity that derive from involvement with the “blue brotherhood” of policing. In 
casting organized police corruption as a form of secular cult, it provides an opportunity to better 
understand the tactics used to entrap new members into corrupt networks, as well as to consider 
the factors that make them vulnerable to recruitment in the first place. 
 




From an organizational culture perspective, the potential for corruption is one of the most 
serious issues faced in law enforcement. More than a simple case of routine professional 
misconduct, institutional corruption fundamentally undermines the compact that gives police 
the consent and authority to operate in the community (Lenz and Chaires 2007). In certain 
situations, in which police corruption reaches an endemic level, public trust in the criminal 
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justice system can be critically damaged to the point where a complete reframing of the 
relationship between officer and citizen (Hough et al. 2010). As such, it prevails on criminal 
justice professionals to develop a greater understanding of the institutional factors that 
contribute to the formation of pervasive police corruption, in the hopes that doing so will allow 
for early identification and intervention. To this point, contemporary perspectives on police 
corruption have begun to reject the traditionalist concept of the “rotten apple” – an officer with 
an intrinsic pull towards corruption who operates independently and, in doing so, tarnishes the 
reputation of the police force as an organization (Bryett and Harrison 1993). Most recent 
scholarly evaluations of police corruption take a more positivist approach by exploring the 
structural factors that contribute to the spread of corruption. In this article, these intra-
organizational factors will be considered in a way that reframes police corruption as a form of 
cult-like group formation. While most modern analyses of police corruption examine it as a 
response to anomic organizational conditions, this article contends that corruption is spread 
intentionally in a way that bears significant comparisons to that in which cults are formed. In 
doing so, a case is made for reassessing existing understandings of the motivations of corrupt 
police officers, as well as advocating for the cultivation of a greater understanding of the 
pressures placed on those officers who enter a pre-existing network of corruption.  
 
In order to effectively prosecute the argument for reconceptualizing police corruption as cult-
like behavior, this article will focus on what is arguably Australia’s most preeminent 
historically important case study of criminal justice misconduct: the Queensland Police Force 
(QPF). From at least the 1950s to the late 1980s, the QPF was controlled by a cabal of corrupt 
officers who presided over an extensive vice-related protection racket; those involved in this 
stand over racket ranged from uniformed junior officers to several Police Commissioners 
(Herbert 1988). Ultimately, this corruption was exposed by the Fitzgerald Inquiry (1987-89) 
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and resulted in the prosecution of several senior officers, including Police Commissioner 
Terrence Lewis, as well as a broad-ranging restructuring of the organization itself. The 
Fitzgerald Inquiry did more than just identify which officers were involved in misconduct: it 
revealed the inner-workings of a corrupt system that prevailed in the QPF for decades, as well 
as exposing the ways in which senior officers in the network sought to extend the system of 
corruption by recruiting junior police into what was referred to colloquially as “the Joke” 
(Herbert 1988; Fitzgerald 1989). The Fitzgerald Inquiry gathered primary evidence of 
misconduct from an array of police (honest and corrupt), politicians and criminal operators. 
Using this evidence as a foundation, this article examines the QPF as a case study of cult-like 
recruitment to police corruption, as well assessing the parallel between the actions of traditional 
cults and the manner in which corrupt QPF officers used coercive tactics to ensure continued 
loyalty to their illicit network. 
 
Methodology 
Before making an assessment as to whether police corruption can be classified as a cult-like 
social formation, it is first essential to develop a clear set of criteria to determine the factors 
that define a group as a “cult”. This presents a clear methodological issue for this article, as 
most cult-oriented literature to this point has focused on the spiritual or religious characteristics 
that usually form a cult’s driving philosophy. In religious scholar Allan W. Eister’s outline of 
a structural theory of cults, he acknowledges that the religious aspects of a cult’s identity are 
conversely incidental and instrumental to their formation: Eister proposes that it is “culture 
crises [that] promote the growth of cult movements … characterized by dislocations in the 
communicational and orientational institutions of society … that normally create and 
standardize symbols” (1972: 319). Eister argues that non-traditional religious belief systems 
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are a manifestation of a state of anomie, in which participants experience a fundamental 
disconnect with generally accepted societal norms and values. These mainstream norms and 
values are replaced with those of the cult, with the collective assuming the role of primary 
social influence over adherents. It is the contention of this article, however, that non-traditional 
religion is not the only form in which cults can manifest. While the article draws on a variety 
of criterion developed over the past four decades to categories the cult-like behaviors it 
discusses, its argument is largely anchored in Fournier and Monroy’s concept of narcissistic 
seduction (1999). An analysis of recruitment and retention practices in conventional religious 
cults, Fournier and Monroy’s work is highly relevant to the case study discussed in this article. 
When supplemented by additional theoretical material on the practices of cults, it forms the 
basis of a typology of cults that can be applied in a policing context.   
 
Much of the reference material used in this article to outline the corruption that existed in the 
QPF has been sourced from files in the Queensland State Archives related to the Fitzgerald 
Inquiry: while many sensitive files connected to this inquiry remain sealed for privacy reasons, 
a considerable amount of the witness testimony and legal exhibits presented to Fitzgerald are 
available for public access. Additionally, government documents in Queensland are ordinarily 
subject to a standard thirty-year non-access period before being released to the public. As this 
article explores corruption in a pre-Fitzgerald QPF – in other words, prior to 1987 – this non-
access period has passed, and access has been granted to a wider range of archival materials 
ranging from cabinet records to official correspondence. This study draws primarily on 
testimony provided to the Fitzgerald Inquiry between 1987 and 1989. Evidence primarily takes 
the form of transcripts of testimony given before the commission, as well as prepared statutory 
declarations submitted in lieu of testimony. Some of this evidence, like the sworn declaration 
of Colin Maxwell Dillon (1988), comes from “honest” police and relates to the general 
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subcultural conditions facilitating corruption in the QPF. Other material, such as the testimony 
of Jack Herbert (1988), comes from admittedly corrupt officers who provided details of the 
Joke after being offered indemnity from prosecution.  
 
Even with access to this wide array of materials, the usual challenges of documentary analysis 
persist wherein archival materials often “do not simply reflect, but also construct social reality 
and versions of events” (May 1997: 164). For this reason, a variety of primary and secondary 
sources related to corruption in the QPF were accessed to provide context; these sources 
include autobiographical works by former QPF officers with intimate knowledge of corruption 
like Domenico Cacciola, official reports published by judicial inquiries into police corruption 
such as Queensland’s Fitzgerald Inquiry (1989) and New South Wales’s Wood Royal 
Commission (1997), and relevant non-fiction publications focused on the period. Some of these 
non-fiction publications, like the work of Chamberlain, Keast and Lauchs (2012) or Brereton 
and Ede (1996), take the form of traditional academic research on corruption’s impact on 
policing in Queensland, as well as law enforcement more generally. These materials provide a 
conceptual framework using which it is possible to better understand the organizational factors 
influencing corrupt networks in the QPF. Other secondary source material is more akin to long-
form journalism, intended to provide a longitudinal perspective on the development of 
corruption over a period of time. The series of books published by journalist Matthew Condon 
– which includes Three Crooked Kings (2013), Jacks and Jokers (2014) and All Fall Down 
(2015) – charts the history of policing in Queensland during the era that is covered by this 
study. Supported by archival research and interviews with a diverse range of participants in the 
events covered in the books, Condon’s series has been recognized with an award by the 





There is considerable utility in adopting a historical criminology approach to support the 
contention that a cultic recruitment model exists in police corruption. By its very nature, 
corruption is a clandestine practice that is difficult to identify and analyze in a contemporary 
setting. The case of the QPF in the pre-Fitzgerald era offers an opportunity to examine a corrupt 
network of police that has already been publicly exposed in a formal judicial inquiry. Making 
an offer of unqualified immunity to officers in return for their testimony on corruption meant 
that the Fitzgerald Inquiry was able to examine clandestine networks in greater detail than 
otherwise would have been possible – a major asset to this study, as it helps to illuminate 
aspects of the recruitment and retention process that have otherwise eluded researchers in this 
field. The purpose of historical criminology is essentially to cultivate a better appreciation of 
past patterns and trends in crime, with the goal of applying the lessons of the past in a 
contemporary context. The vast breadth of documentary materials produced by the Fitzgerald 
Inquiry and held in the Queensland State Archives allows for a thorough re-examination of 
police corruption in a system where it reached an endemic level. It provides as full a picture of 
a clandestine network of corruption that is available, and thereby serves as a perfect case study 
through which to explore the issue of cultic recruitment in this context.  
 
The primary source material that informs this article was the product of periods of archival 
research conducted at two locations: the Queensland State Archives at Runcorn, and the 
Queensland State Library in South Brisbane. Each of these venues holds an extensive range of 
documents related not just to the Fitzgerald Inquiry but, importantly, to policing administration 
in the era before this epochal event. As noted, there were some limitations of the availability 
of data as a result of restricted access periods placed on certain sensitive documents. For those 
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documents that were not specifically subject to extended restriction, the standard release period 
is thirty years. Data collection occurred between 2017 and 2019 — exactly thirty years after 
the Fitzgerald Inquiry’s 1987 to 1989 proceedings (Fitzgerald 1989; Condon 2015). Because 
of this, a diversity of new material was available to access that had not been obtainable prior 
to this study, including (but not limited to) inquiry transcripts, sworn witness statements and 
correspondence between the QPF and state government. As an initial step, all available 
documents held in the Fitzgerald Inquiry’s archives were accessed. All relevant files were then 
scanned, catalogued and annotated after close reading. Once the inquiry’s files were analyzed 
in this way, new leads emerged that directed further archival research. If an officer’s name 
recurred in the testimony offered to Fitzgerald, for example, personnel and case files relevant 
to that person were accessed from the archives to determine if there was any further information 
that could provide insight into the networks of corruption at play in the QPF. In many ways, 
this secondary stage of research was exploratory and, often, did not bear verifiable results due 
to restricted access periods and, particularly, incomplete files that did not include all the detail 
needed for a complete evaluation. Based on May’s (1997) critique of documentary analysis, 
concerns around the biases of those who originally created the archival material also had to be 
considered. Part of the article’s central thesis is that corruption was endemic in Queensland, 
and so it follows that much of the material accessed was created by individuals with a vested 
interest in concealing misconduct. Bias was accounted for by contextualizing primary source 
material with secondary sources like Condon’s series. Broader understanding of the networks 
of corruption at work in the QPF provided an opportunity to assess the likely motivations of 
the author of each document, which was included in the annotations of each document during 
the primary collection phase. Where possible, Fitzgerald Inquiry documents were used based 
on the view that authors of these materials were less likely to be involved in corruption, having 
been closely vetted by Fitzgerald ahead of becoming involved in the anticorruption operation. 
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The statements of officers provided with indemnity from prosecution were also treated as (on 
balance) more accurate than those of officers who did not take an indemnity deal, given the 
potential risk of prosecution influencing the probability of honesty in the latter group.  
 
Foundational Literature 
A diversity of research has been conducted on the factors that make an individual vulnerable 
to recruitment into deviant subcultural groups. Durkheim’s concept of anomie is central to this 
process of recruitment and retention into such groups — both by priming individuals for 
involvement and, once they are a part of the group, facilitating a deregulation of their existing 
values and belief systems to be supplanted by those promoted by the cult (Stark and Bainbridge 
1980). Robert K. Merton’s seminal interpretation of anomie is highly relevant to this process, 
particularly when it comes to corrupt policing networks. Mertonian anomie is closely linked to 
strain and the concept that deviance occurs when individuals find that they are unable to 
achieve their goals through legitimate means (Merton 1957). Such a realization drives the 
affected person to engage in deviant behavior to achieve their goals through illegitimate means 
instead, ultimately experiencing a fundamental reshaping of normative values. This is 
particularly true in groups where there is a shared strain or frustration with the inability to 
achieve goals through conventional pathways. Groups with a shared frustration like this can, 
under the right conditions, develop an anomic culture of norms that are out of alignment with 
wider society. The validation of other group members only serves to strengthen these norms, 
securing the anomic group’s internal cohesion and supporting further deviant behavior.  
 
As noted, there are considerable theoretical challenges involved in attempting to establish a 
religion-free criterion of cult-like social formations. Scholarly interest in the subject has 
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primarily focused on religion as a key motivator for recruitment into a cult. Bruce Campbell 
(1978) distinguished between three subtypes of cults, each of which were in some way driven 
by religious or spiritual factors: an illumination type that is grounded in the mystical, an 
instrumental type wherein “inner experience is sought for its effects”, and a service-oriented 
type wherein the individual was focused on providing aid to others (228). Despite Campbell’s 
clear focus on the spiritual drivers of cult affiliation, it should be observed that only one subtype 
– illumination – was predicated on an overtly-religious system. Both the instrumental and 
service-oriented subtypes may have been associated with religious philosophy in practice, but 
at their core are fundamentally individualistic motivations related more to the cult members 
desire to improve themselves or the world around them. Like earlier scholars in the field, Eileen 
Barker (2010) inextricably links cults to what she describes as “new religious movements” 
(NRMs), and makes the argument that a large part of the social construction of these NRMs as 
a social problem derives from the antagonistic relationship they establish with the world around 
them. Barker notes that “it is not uncommon for the movements to operate with a dichotomous 
world-view, erecting a sharp boundary between ‘us’ (the insiders) and ‘them’ (the outsiders)” 
which, in turn, encourages members to isolate themselves from wider society and perceive non-
members as some form of alien “other” (2010: 201-202). While both Campbell and Barker 
focus their attention on religiously-oriented cults, the characteristics that they identify can 
clearly be applied to the cult-like social formations in corrupt policing networks: at the core of 
their argument is a recognition of the role of individualistic motivations in driving cult 
recruitment, as well as the practice of self-segregation that occurs when the values of an in-
group (corrupt officers) are in mismatch with those held by the out-group (the public).  
 
While this article is concerned with cult-like behaviors in police corruption, it is mostly 
interested in the process of recruitment and retention that occurs in corrupt networks. For this 
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reason, Anne Fournier and Michel Monroy’s (1999) theories on narcissistic seduction in cults 
is of high significance. Described as the first step in cult commitment, the practical application 
of narcissistic seduction techniques can be readily observed in the recruitment of corrupt 
officers in the QPF. Narcissistic seduction occurs when a seducer-recruiter, in this case an 
already-corrupt officer, uses methods of psychological manipulation to target non-corrupt 
officers for inclusion in an existing network. There are several factors that the seducer-recruiter 
must consider in this process: this may include the vulnerability of the target, existing group 
dynamics, emotional pressures, out-group attachments and, ultimately, the cult’s ability to 
assist the target in achieving their objectives (Fournier and Monroy 1999). Resulting from this 
process of seduction, the target’s personal happiness becomes inextricably tied to their 
involvement in the cult in a cycle of dependence in which the absence of the cult, and the 
benefits that it provides, has an intrinsic negative impact on the now-indoctrinated member of 
the in-group (Duretete et al. 2008). While this is no doubt a practical reflection of how 
religiously oriented cults attract members, the process of narcissistic seduction outlined by 
Fournier and Monroy can be applied beyond the scope of traditional cults. In this case, religion 
is incidental to the recruitment of members to the in-group, and merely serves as an organizing 
philosophy around which the cult is formed. By this logic, any in-group with a clearly defined 
structure and ideology may use the same processes of seductive-recruitment, and operate under 
the same organizational principles traditionally associated with cults.   
 
In general terms, the cult-like social formation that exists within police forces globally has 
already been given a name: the blue brotherhood. A term routinely associated with the anomic 
social conditions found in policing, the blue brotherhood refers to the propensity of police 
officers to support each other unconditionally, and to turn a blind-eye to misconduct out of a 
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sense of professional loyalty (Kleinig 2001; Raab and Milward 2003; Lauchs et al. 2012; 
Merrington 2017). While this sense of camaraderie can form in any organization, Jerome 
Skolnick argues that the bonds formed between police officers are often more familial than 
professional, arising from a context in which they were “obliged to back up each other, protect 
each other, and follow each other into situations of grave danger” (2008: 38). Shannon 
Merrington asserts that these familial bonds of loyalty are “so strong that officers are willing 
to lie or commit perjury to protect the conduct of fellow officers” in a sub-practice common in 
the brotherhood known as the ‘code of silence’ (2017: 21). An expectation exists within the 
blue brotherhood that members put the interests of the in-group above all others, in a clear 
reflection of cult-like social conditioning. This commitment to the interests of the collective 
over that of the individual has been identified as a central cause of pervasive corruption in 
policing. James Wood (1997) found in his investigation of police corruption in New South 
Wales that officers who went against “the code” and reported the corruption of their colleagues 
in the blue brotherhood were often marginalized within the police force; more than social 
ostracism, this rejection by the brotherhood often had a tangible impact on officers’ careers — 
particularly when corrupt members of the brotherhood were in positions of ultimate authority, 
as was the case in the QPF. 
 
A range of literature exists that specifically examines the practice of corruption in the QPF in 
the pre-Fitzgerald era, mostly due to the high degree of prominence and impact that the 
commission had on the understanding of how police misconduct was practiced in Australia. 
Marni Manning asserts that the Fitzgerald Inquiry made Queensland the perfect case study of 
police corruption, and revealed “three broad and inconvenient truths”: that the profession of 
policing itself was inherently insular, exhibited an ineffectual internal environment and 
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operated within a deficient external environment (2014: 137). In short, Manning suggests that 
many of the issues raised by the Fitzgerald Inquiry derived from the lack of internal and 
external regulation over the conduct of officers. David Brereton and Andrew Ede support 
Manning’s position, arguing that the lack of controls in the QPF contributed to corruption, and 
that the fact that senior police were involved in corruption “and were prepared to use their 
positions of power to deal harshly with dissenters … [meant that] this elite was able to exploit, 
to its own advantage, the natural attractions of the code [of silence]” (1996: 108-109). As in 
Fournier and Monroy’s (1999) discussion of cults, Brereton and Ede indicate that the 
indoctrination into the in-group of the blue brotherhood was a key strategy in the protection of 
corrupt networks in the QPF. Chamberlain, Keast and Lauchs directly addressed the existence 
of the blue brotherhood in Queensland policing, describing the QPF as a social network in 
which “peer pressure, social approval and sanction (stigma) … bind individuals to a collective 
unit” (2012: 196). With that considered, it could be argued that internal regulation did exist in 
the QPF; rather than a formal control mechanism, however, this internal regulation was 
informally managed by the blue brotherhood.  
 
The Cultic Recruitment Model of Corruption in Practice 
The Offer: Seductive-recruitment into Corruption in the QPF 
Membership in the blue brotherhood is a persuasive motivator for officers to participate in 
corruption, whether it be actively by engaging in misconduct or passively by ignoring the 
corrupt activities of their colleagues (Merrington 2017; Skolnick 2008). Nevertheless, before 
being inducted into an existing network of corruption, a targeted officer is often tested to ensure 
that their commitment to the blue brotherhood is strong enough to withstand a formal offer to 
participate in organized corruption. The selection of targeted officers is an important step for 
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members of a corrupt network: should an offer be extended to an officer who is not willing to 
engage in corruption, the corrupt recruiter runs the risk of exposing their network and leaving 
both themselves and their co-conspirators vulnerable to punitive disciplinary action (Prenzler 
and Ronken 2001). For this reason, seductive-recruitment into a web of corruption takes a 
similar approach to that of a cult, targeting individuals with some form of intrinsic or extrinsic 
vulnerability that can be manipulated in such a way that they can be convinced to suspend their 
existing values in order to adopt those of the in-group (Fournier and Monroy 1999). As Eister’s 
structural theory on cults (1972) acknowledges, deviant cult-like social formations occur when 
“cultural crises” happen that dislocate an individual from the orientational factors that 
mainstream society is constructed around. Without such a dislocation, it is a considerable 
challenge for seducer-recruiters to convince a target to join a deviant subgroup, whether that 
be a cult or a network of corrupt police. Though it is possible to intentionally precipitate such 
a dislocative cultural crisis, it is often easier for the seducer-recruiter to identify a target that is 
already either in the process of crisis, or vulnerable to one.  
 
While the social role that they assume is typically seen as that of the strict authoritarian, police 
officers are typically subject to a greater range of potential vulnerabilities than the average 
person. In mercenary corruption – wherein officers are offered a bribe for permitting illegal 
activity to take place – the most common vulnerability may be financial difficulty, but this is 
not the only factor that motivates police to engage in corruption. In many cases, officers who 
face personal issues such as sexual impropriety or substance abuse problems, or have 
previously participated in lower-level corruption are also vulnerable to recruitment into a 
corrupt network (Punch 2009). In describing the risk factors for corruption in policing, Tim 
Newburn cautions against the stationing of “vulnerable people … in situations where the 
opportunities are particularly tempting to them” (1999: 46). Newburn describes this position 
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as “the invitational edge”: an often-ephemeral place in which an individual is open to 
corruption based on a range of variables influencing them to commit deviant acts. Although it 
found corrupt practices in virtually every part of the QPF, the Fitzgerald Inquiry was able to 
pinpoint certain areas of policing that were closer to the invitational edge than others — in 
particular, the Licensing Branch and the Consorting Squad (Lucas 1977; Dickie 1988). 
Fitzgerald identified these units as the ones in which police were regularly in direct contact 
with criminal offenders and, as such, where the greatest potential for corruption existed. 
Corruption in the Licensing Branch ultimately became a key focus for the Fitzgerald Inquiry, 
which found that a corrupt network of protection referred to as the Joke had existed in some 
form or another in this unit from at least the late 1950s (Herbert 1988). Given that officers in 
the Licensing Branch were responsible for the policing of vice activity from illegal gambling 
to prostitution, ample opportunity existed for corrupt officers to sanction criminal behaviors in 
return for financial compensation.  
 
Extrinsic motivations like the opportunity to financially benefit from their position meant that 
corruption in these areas of the QPF was pervasive, as corrupt Licensing Branch officer Jack 
Herbert testified to at the Fitzgerald Inquiry (Herbert 1988; Dickie 1988; Fitzgerald 1989). In 
transcripts of testimony, Herbert tells Fitzgerald that during the period in which he managed 
the Joke he approached most officers that were attached to the branch and “every single officer 
… approached to join in the joke [sic] did so quite willingly” (Fitzgerald 1989: 33). It is 
noteworthy that in this testimony Herbert clarifies that he did not approach every officer that 
came into the branch, and instead used an informal vetting process to identify those who were 
most susceptible to a corrupt overture. Herbert’s recruitment of Detective Tony Murphy into 
the Joke in 1966 provides insight into the factors he considered when recruiting a new officer 
into the corrupt network. Herbert claims that Murphy’s reputation for corruption while serving 
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in the Consorting Squad had preceded him, and despite the two men not knowing each other 
well, Herbert felt that this rumored history of misconduct was reason enough to believe Murphy 
would be interested in being recruited into the Joke (Fitzgerald 1989). Herbert was correct: not 
only did Murphy agree to join the protection racket, he suggested the further recruitment of 
other officers like future commissioner Terry Lewis, who he felt could use their political 
connections to further the reach of the network (Condon 2013). Again, as in a traditional cult, 
recruitment to the Joke often occurred as part of a chain: as one officer was successfully 
integrated into the system, they were able to recruit other colleagues who they felt could be 
persuaded to participate in corruption. In this case, the seductive-recruiter draws on several of 
Fournier and Monroy’s (1999) criteria for targeting individuals to join a cult. Aside from 
considering the individual vulnerabilities of the recruited officer – often financial pressures – 
the seductive-recruiter also depends on existing group dynamics and the connections between 
officers (both professional and personal) to build a more extensive corrupt network. 
 
As theorists like Eister (1972) and Campbell (1978) suggest, however, extrinsic motivations 
are only one factor that contributes to a target’s susceptibility to be recruited into a cult. 
Campbell’s typology clearly delineates between individuals who join a cult in the hopes of 
achieving personal benefit, and others who are motivated by more intrinsic or ideological 
factors. The same is true of policing, where an officer’s initial foray into misconduct is often 
driven by a frustration with the inefficacy of the legal process rather than an outright desire to 
misuse their authority for personal gain (Punch 2009). Referred to by Wood (1997) as “process 
corruption” this behavior often occurs in situations where police genuinely believe that the best 
way to achieve justice is by manipulating the system, or otherwise acting outside of the 
established procedural rules. While his final report focused primarily on the organized network 
of mercenary corruption in the Licensing Branch, Fitzgerald nevertheless described the “refusal 
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of police to … allow the criminal justice system to operate as intended” was far more pervasive 
than stereotypical police bribery (1989: 206). Process corruption in the QPF manifested in a 
range of different ways, from the planting of evidence on suspects to secure a conviction to the 
common practice of fabricating a false confession (Prenzler 2009). These actions were not 
typically driven by the desire for extrinsic benefit, and yet they nonetheless contributed to 
drawing officers into the cult of corruption that existed within the QPF. In a sense, recruitment 
into corruption by this avenue was the result of a sense of professional strain: as police found 
their efforts to apply justice stymied by procedure, their acceptance of the structural conditions 
in which they were expected to operate shifted to the point that a condition of anomie developed 
in the QPF (Punch 2009). In this anomic state, corruption was not only tolerated, but in many 
cases encouraged as a legitimate tool to ensure that justice prevailed.  
 
In some cases, the willingness to participate in process corruption for no financial gain was a 
reason to consider officers for inclusion in a corrupt network. Indeed, in the case of Herbert’s 
recruitment of Murphy, it was the latter’s reputation for process corruption that preceded him 
more so than the explicit knowledge that he had willingly received bribes in the past (Fitzgerald 
1989). In other cases, however, tolerance of process corruption was so ingrained in the culture 
of the QPF’s blue brotherhood that even those who were opposed to rackets like the Joke were 
prone to use it for their own ends. In the mid-to-late 1970s, Licensing Branch Inspector Arthur 
Pitts and his successor, Alec Jeppesen, were both dedicated to eradicating corruption and 
shutting down the Joke (Dickie 1988). Even so, both Pitts and Jeppesen were revealed to have 
conspired to commit perjury and act outside of their jurisdiction in a case against protected 
illegal bookmakers Stanley Saunders and Brian Sieber in November 1974. The report of the 
Lucas Inquiry recounts that Pitts and his team had followed Saunders and Sieber into a 
neighboring state before raiding their vehicle, but were later clandestinely recorded agreeing 
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to perjure themselves by claiming that the raid occurred in a different location that was within 
the QPF’s jurisdiction (Lucas 1977). Lucas determined that this corruption was the result of a 
culture that “guaranteed not only discretion [from police], but ready assistance in perjury if this 
should be required” (Lucas 1977: 28). Pitts, Jeppesen and their co-conspirators had not been 
recruited into a specific corrupt network like the Joke, and yet the cultural crisis in the QPF 
that gave rise to this corruption also undoubtedly influenced their own illegal actions. It is 
within this context where corruption was treated as generally permissible that the seductive-
recruiters of the QPF operated. With even purportedly “honest” officers implicated in corrupt 
practices, the barrier preventing other officers from engaging in other forms of misconduct was 
lowered and they were effectively primed for recruitment into a cult of corruption (Eister 1972; 
Brereton and Ede 1996). 
 
The Trap: Intrinsic Motivators for Officers Recruited into Corruption 
As Eister (1972) notes, cultural crises are an important aspect of cult formation: absent the 
existence of an anomic state of moral deregulation, there is less opportunity for a cult to reshape 
an individual’s worldview. Importantly when it comes to strategies for member retention, it is 
also this anomic deregulation that primes cult members to participate in activities that they 
would not do under ordinary circumstances. Non-conformist group behaviors were a key 
element of Merton’s concept of how strain influences anomie: in his view, when a group 
experiences a shared set of structural pressures there is a higher likelihood of that group 
exhibiting a shared set of deviant behaviors. Merton describes several modes of adaptation to 
anomic strain, beginning with total conformity to cultural goals and the conventional means of 
achieving them — essentially, social normativity (Merton 1957). From this launch pad, Merton 
discusses various combination where individuals under strain reject or accept cultural goals 
and institutional means. For members of traditional spiritually oriented cults, for example, a 
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rejection of both cultural goals and institutional means can result in retreatism from society 
entirely. For a police officer whose attempt to do their job is frustrated by regulations and 
professional ethics, the cultural goals are accepted while the institutional means are not. Merton 
(1957) calls this response innovation, where an individual under strain develops new and often 
illegitimate means of achieving proscribed goals.  
 
A recruited member’s willingness to suspend personal reservations and put their full trust in 
the cult is the result of a slow process of indoctrination, during which time they are 
incrementally separated from their external support system as it is replaced by that of one 
supplied by the in-group, the cult (Fournier and Monroy 1999). It is at this stage, wherein the 
recruit has been fully isolated from their pre-existing networks and segregated from dissenting 
opinions, that full incorporation in the cult occurs (Duretete et al. 2008).  Segregation of an 
exclusive in-group is a fundamental aspect of cult formation, just as it was in the corrupt 
networks of the QPF. Just as cult members operate in a way that is oppositional to mainstream 
culture, identity in the QPF was typically delineated between honest police officers and those 
that were “in on the Joke” (participated in corruption). While all officers could claim to be part 
of the macro-culture that constituted the blue brotherhood, it was only those that were prepared 
to engage in corruption or turn a blind-eye to the misconduct of their colleagues that were truly 
considered to be committed to the fraternity of the QPF (Lucas 1977). By its very nature, 
corruption is practiced in a clandestine way: even if not kept secret from other officers in the 
brotherhood, it is concealed from the public to avoid criticism and professional sanctions 




Secrecy has a significant role to play in segregating an in-group, and fostering an anomic 
condition within it. By forcing members to keep their participation in an in-group secret from 
“outsiders”, it is inevitable that an individual will turn to their fellow members for support and 
counsel (Sponholz 2005). In a cult, this makes the recruit increasingly more dependent on other 
members for support, rather than being exposed to alternative opinions from outside the in-
group. The same occurred in the corrupt networks of the QPF where, rather than seeking the 
advice of non-corrupt colleagues, officers were put in a position where they could only admit 
their involvement to others involved in the same networks; as a result, they engaged in a 
feedback loop wherein corrupt officers justified and normalized misconduct to each other 
(Ashforth and Vikas 2003). As it does in cults, secrecy and segregation fostered an anomic 
state in the corrupt networks of the QPF, and prevented officers recruited into corruption from 
being able to acknowledge that their behaviors went against the professional norms and societal 
expectations of their role.  
 
The risk of being excommunicated from a corrupt in-group is a persuasive reason for officers 
to continue participating in misconduct. As Duretete et al. (2008) note in their discussion of 
cults, isolating a corrupt officer from other officers not engaged in corruption makes them 
increasingly dependent on the corrupt network for support and fellowship. This is particularly 
important in organizations like the QPF, in which corruption was pervasive across all levels of 
the police hierarchy (Fitzgerald 1989). With so many officers either actively involved in 
misconduct, or at least passively tolerating it, exposing members of the blue brotherhood as 
corrupt meant an officer risked disfellowship not just from the in-group of corruption but from 
the brotherhood of policing itself (Brereton and Ede 1996). Disfellowship is powerful 
disincentive for action against any cult. An important phase of the seductive-recruitment 
process involves the manipulation of an officer’s emotional responses to the point that their 
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personal happiness and sense of identity derives from being a member of the in-group (Fournier 
and Monroy 1999). If this status quo changes, an officer is likely to suffer from an identity 
crisis as they attempt to renegotiate their self-conception. In police forces where corruption is 
limited, there is a potential for corruption whistle-blowers to resume the master role of police 
officer even after leaving the corrupt in-group. In the QPF this was more challenging because 
corruption was pervasive to the extent that a rejection of corruption was virtually synonymous 
with rejecting membership of the blue brotherhood entirely. The central role of the blue 
brotherhood to an officer’s identity made the decision to take this step challenging for officers, 
and dissuaded many from speaking out against corruption for fear of losing the sense of identity 
that they had developed as members of the policing fraternity.  
 
The Stick: Blackmail, Threats and Extrinsic Motivations for Corrupt Affiliation 
Anomic conditioning allows cults to retain members by normalizing their behaviors, at least 
within the in-group that they are now a part of. In cases where this intrinsic motivation is not 
enough, however, cults often have cause to use extrinsic measures to coerce members into 
remaining a part of the in-group. Kulik and Alarcon describe fear and guilt as “the glue of 
communities in manipulative organizations … in cults the binding emotion is more akin to 
terror, based on violence, coercion, blackmail, threats, and complete dependence” (2012: 30). 
In many cults, the collection of coercive material in a cult occurs under the guise of personal 
growth and self-improvement facilitated by the in-group. Cult-like groups like NXIVM and 
the Church of Scientology insist on members providing them with compromising personal 
information by claiming that this assists the in-group in helping a member achieve their 
objectives. In Scientology, the practice of auditing is portrayed as a way for members to “clear” 
themselves of psychological burden by being counselled by more senior Scientologists; in 
reality, auditing has been described as a chance for the in-group to gather blackmail material 
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that could be used to coerce an individual into remaining with the group should they ever wish 
to leave (Cusack 2016). Similarly, NXIVM – a purported self-improvement group that has been 
alternatively described as a sex cult – overtly collected “collateral” from its members in a 
variety of forms ranging from personal possessions to explicit images. NXIVM used this 
collateral to ensure that members adhered to their personal goals: if a member agreed to lose 
weight for example, and failed in this objective, their NXIVM superior could take possession 
of, or otherwise use, the collateral that they provided (Grigoriadis 2018). Using material 
supplied by cult members for self-help purposes in a coercive manner is a common tactic of 
membership retention in such groups: Boland and Lindbloom observe that providing 
psychotherapy is a routine tactic for cults that serves as “a source of surveillance … and the 
basis for threats of blackmail against an alienated member” (1992: 143).  
 
Blackmail, specifically the threat of being exposed as corrupt, was a key component of keeping 
officers within the corrupt networks that existed in the QPF prior to the Fitzgerald Inquiry. 
Senior members of the Joke were not reluctant to fabricate incriminating material. In his 
memoir, former Detective Domenico Cacciola recalled occasions on which corrupt officer Jack 
Herbert would take bath towels from brothels during raids, and instruct other officers in the 
Joke to take them home and have sex on them with their wives; these towels would then be 
returned to Herbert, who would use them as evidence that prostitution was taking place on 
premises that refused to participate in his protection system (Cacciola and Robertson 2014). A 
regular strategy was to implicate non-corrupt officers in corruption slowly, without asking them 
to commit any specific corrupt acts at first. QPF officer Jim Slade told the Fitzgerald Inquiry 
that his superior at the Bureau of Criminal Intelligence, Alan Barnes, began paying him a sum 
of $100 a month that allegedly came from Italian organized crime figures the Gerry and Tony 
Bellino (Condon 2015). Barnes did not request any action from Slade and, in fact, told Slade 
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that “a hundred a month is not bad for doing nothing” (Dickie 1988: 115). By offering Slade 
money from organized crime figures, and Slade accepting this money, Barnes had effectively 
compromised Slade to a point where he could use knowledge of Slade accepting illicit 
payments to extort him into committing further acts of corruption.  
 
The case of Colin Dillon shows that this was not an isolated incident. Dillon testified to the 
Fitzgerald Inquiry that officer Harry Burgess, in some ways Herbert’s successor in organizing 
the Joke, had overtly approached him to participate in corruption in late 1982 (Dickie 1988: 
93). In a statutory declaration supplied to Fitzgerald, Dillion said that after he refused this offer, 
Burgess placed a bottle of expensive whiskey in his locker and told him it was a “gift” from 
prostitution operator Anne-Marie Tilley (Dillon 1988). Again, Burgess attempted to 
compromise Dillon by implicating him in corruption against his will, with the likely goal of 
using this as collateral against him should he ever decide to take action by informing on Burgess 
and his collaborators in the Joke (Dillon 1988). As in a traditional cult, the cult of police 
corruption in the QPF sustained itself through fear. Officers did not act against the in-group 
because of a fear that their own impropriety would in turn be used against them. In this way, 
officers became trapped in the cult of corruption. As Kulik and Alarcon (2012) described, fear 
of reprisal is a key factor of any manipulative organization, and corruption in the QPF was no 
different. Just as it was with any other cult, threats and intimidation were essential extrinsic 
motivators for continued participation in corruption. Once an officer implicated themselves in 
misconduct, they were vulnerable to this type of coercive control which both prevented them 
from leaving the in-group and often drove them towards further, more serious manifestations 





Organized police corruption is a subject that has attracted a limited degree of attention of the 
literature comparable to its prominence in the socio-cultural zeitgeist. As a result, there have 
been relatively few attempts to analyze how it develops in a practical setting. Theoretical 
analysis of police corruption thus far has tended to adopt a structural perspective, treating 
endemic misconduct as an expression of an anomic organizational culture (Tillman 2009). 
While the existence of a deviant organizational culture undeniably paves the way for corruption 
to take root, to assign responsibility for police corruption entirely to structural factors is to 
ignore the active role played by the officers who manage these illicit networks. By time its final 
report was released in mid-1989, the Fitzgerald Inquiry had revealed that corruption in the QPF 
was pervasive; rather than a case of “rotten apples” operating independently of each other, 
corruption in Queensland was well-organized and managed from within the highest echelons 
of the QPF hierarchy (Herbert 1988; Fitzgerald 1989). Fitzgerald was granted the authority to 
offer immunity from prosecution to officers who testified about the inner workings of this 
corrupt network and, because of this, a thorough outline emerged of how illicit protection 
rackets like the Joke operated. Testimony revealed that organizational culture was but one 
aspect of a more extensive system of recruitment and retention into the corrupt in-groups that 
existed in the QPF. Instead of occurring as the result of a passive social conditioning in the 
blue brotherhood individual officers were targeted for inclusion in corrupt activity, and were 
in turn enlisted by existing participants in a corrupt network using the tactics of seductive-
recruitment outlined in Fournier and Monroy’s (1999) analysis of cult membership.  
 
Currently there is a limited range of literature that applies cult theory to non-religiously or 
spiritually oriented groups. Despite this, the group dynamics of cults can just as easily be 
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applied to organized corruption in the blue brotherhood as to a conventional NRM (Barker 
2010). As with cults, recruiting an officer into organized corruption requires that they suspend 
their pre-existing values, attitudes and beliefs in favor of those promoted by the in-group. This 
is an evolution that occurs organically over time, but is often triggered by pressures exerted by 
external actors seeking to shape the recruit’s perspective (Kulik and Alarcon 2012). Seductive-
recruiters use a range of strategies to facilitate the kind of cultural crisis that allows for anomic 
reconditioning to take place. Whether it is by isolating recruits from their emotional support 
systems or, alternatively, showcasing the way that deviant practices can be used to achieve the 
recruit’s goals, the ultimate objective of the seductive-recruiter is to create a situation wherein 
the recruit becomes dependent on the deviant in-group (Duretete et al. 2008). Once this occurs, 
the seductive-recruiter’s primary role shifts from promoting the benefits of membership to 
ensuring that the recruit does not undermine the solidarity of the in-group by leaving it. 
Retention of members is often predicated on intrinsic motivators like a fear of the social 
isolation that may occur after leaving the in-group, as well as extrinsic pressures such as the 
risk of being targeted by members of the in-group using blackmail in a manner that could be 
either coercive or retributive (Kulik and Alarcon 2012).  
 
Little distinction can be made between the way that organized police corruption recruits and 
retains members, and the methods used by traditional cults. Both are heavily reliant on a 
doctrine of unquestioning loyalty to the in-group, which is facilitated by the recruit’s enforced 
segregation existing social networks increasing their dependence on the in-group. Ultimately, 
a prolonged dependence of this nature results in the recruit associating their identity with that 
of the in-group. At this point, extricating the individual from the group becomes difficult: the 
individual perceives the welfare of the in-group as synonymous with their own, and risks to the 
in-group transform into a threat to their own survival. Corrupt QPF members used both intrinsic 
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manipulation and extrinsic threats to ensure the continued survival of their networks. Cults use 
the exact same methods, for the same purposes: to prevent members from leaving, and to 
expose the deviant practices that take place under the veil of secrecy cast over the in-group. 
While recruitment is important to expand the reach of the in-group, retaining members is more 
vital to its continuing existence. Organized police corruption might not fall under any 
traditional definition of a cult, but there are obvious similarities in the way each practices the 
recruitment and retention of members. At their core, cults and organized corruption are driven 
by the same central challenge: how to maintain the clandestine nature of the in-group while 
nevertheless seeking to recruit new members. Organized police corruption has adopted the 
same methods as a cult to accomplish this, utilizing a mix of structural conditions and coercive 
techniques to ensure that it is a significant risk to leave the in-group once a member is recruited. 
 
Corruption is rarely the case of individual, rogue operators. Instead, it is usually the product of 
an anomic culture that facilitates deviant group behaviors. In cases where corruption becomes 
endemically entrenched in a police force, as it did in the QPF, the subcultural processes by 
which officers are recruited into corruption are not unlike those that can be observed in non-
traditional religious movements, or cults. There is a utility in using a historical case study like 
that of the QPF to explore the formation of corrupt networks. The passage of time has allowed 
us to take a longitudinal perspective on corruption in the organization, and to better trace the 
connections between corrupt actors within the system. It gives us the kind of holistic view on 
police corruption that is not often available when analyzing contemporary corruption, where 
participants have a more clearly vested interest in maintaining the clandestine nature of the 
network. Analyzing the network of corruption that existed in the QPF has implications for 
contemporary anticorruption efforts in that it allows us to form a better idea of what corruption 
looks like in practice, and the methods of recruitment that contribute to extending the control 
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that corrupt networks are able to exert over the institution of policing. There are lessons to be 
learned for anticorruption practitioners here: by viewing the recruitment processes of 
corruption as being analogous to those used by cults, it is possible to identify and resolve the 
key areas of vulnerability that make recruits susceptible to being drawn into anomic subcultures 
of policing. If solutions can be developed to address these issues then practitioners will be 
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